The negotiations and the Elysée-Oudinot agreement were insincere.

Hello everyone,

The APROFED association is contacting you again this week following the announcement by the State of the signing of an agreement called Elysée-Oudinot, contested as expected by the majority of the separatists who consider it to be blackmail (cf. The FLNKS separatists reject the new “Elysée-Oudinot agreement” ) demonstrating the insincerity of the discussions between them and the State.

It is worth recalling here that the project of the Caledonian Union, as mentioned several times in our articles, on our site, and by historians, was never pure and simple independence but the desire to regain the autonomy granted by France at the end of the Second World War and immediately taken back arbitrarily by it following the waves of decolonization.

It was France itself that, let us remember, pushed the Kanaks to choose independence by leaving them with only this choice or that of assimilation in the 1970s. Thus, it is France that is at the origin of the independence project against which the loyalists are fighting.

However, it is worth recalling the statements of the pro- independence supporters before and after the uprising to realize that they were the ones who made the most compromises .

Indeed, the aim was never to achieve independence by 2027, but rather to secure a date, and only a date, by then for the implementation of a new referendum on self-determination . However, while the draft Bougival agreement stipulates that this international law remains in force, it renders its application virtually impossible.

The pro-independence parties have even said they are ready to sign a third and final statute after the Matignon-Oudinot and Nouméa statutes with a view to achieving full sovereignty in collaboration with the State.

Regarding sovereign powers and their transfer, while some pro-independence supporters favored the proposal made by the State during the Déva conclave —a status of associated state, aiming to recover these powers entirely before transferring them back to the State—others, given the loyalists’ rejection of this proposal, suggested a phased transfer over the duration of the next status. Here again, the draft Bougival agreement, although granting the possibility of transferring these sovereign powers, imposed an institutional mechanism that makes it seem impossible for these transfers to be effective.

It is interesting to note on this point that the association’s federalist message, and its solution no. 2, is gradually spreading insofar as some pro-independence groups have stipulated that certain sovereign powers could be transferred not to France but to some of its Pacific neighbors (cf. The FLNKS denounces a “pseudo-agreement” and intends to continue its fight for full sovereignty | Les Nouvelles Calédoniennes ).

Regarding the unfreezing of the electoral roll, a key issue that sparked the uprising, the pro-independence movement has again indicated that it is not opposed to the integration of native-born citizens into the electoral system. However, this partial unfreezing must be part of a comprehensive, consensual agreement and not treated separately, in order to avoid a new wave of organized mass immigration aimed at maintaining them as a minority in their own land—a practice some have termed recolonization, which would also be contrary to international law.

But what were the State’s proposals in return?

Of the five core sovereign powers—justice, policing, defense, currency, and diplomacy—the French state, through the Bougival Agreement, acknowledges a desire to share international relations (diplomacy) more from an economic than a political perspective . New Caledonia could thus negotiate with its neighbors in areas within its jurisdiction without being accompanied by a state representative, as is currently the case. However, it would still be required to submit all such agreements to the state for approval, which in reality does not significantly alter the current situation. The state would continue to have the final say.

France also grants the territory the status of a state , one of the oldest demands of the independence movement, without, however, defining the content of this state, which risks becoming, like the notion of “country,” an empty shell in legal terms. France nevertheless stipulates that this new state may be recognized internationally by other countries. The problem is that, lacking the characteristics established by international conventions, this new state remains recognized by only a few, as is the case, for example, with Kosovo today. It is also surprising that, after abandoning the option of an associated state and moving instead towards a kind of regional state, along the lines of Spain, France is offering the independence movement such a possibility, given that no regional, or even federated, state is recognized internationally, particularly within the United Nations. Moreover, there is no question of this new state having a seat at the UN , except perhaps as an observer?

The plan to strengthen the provinces (a kind of department) at the expense of the new Caledonian state raises questions about the consistency of the new state, which risks being emptied of its substance, like a snail’s shell, leading some pro-independence supporters to describe this approach as “partition”.

On the other hand, a state implies a constitution . However, to avoid causing offense at the highest levels of the French state, the term ” fundamental law ,” synonymous with “constitution” and borrowed from France’s German neighbors, was preferred. The problem here, once again, is that upon reading the draft Bougival agreement, this future Caledonian constitution appears meaningless, if not entirely empty, as it addresses only a few subjects, superseded by a special organic law drafted by the French state itself, defining the functioning of the future Caledonian state. Although this fundamental law is to be drafted by the Congress of New Caledonia, it is not, according to the draft Bougival agreement, mandatory . Aimed at defining the final symbols of identity—the name of the future Caledonian state and its flag—two issues on which pro-independence and pro-French factions have never been able to agree, it is clear that this fundamental law is unlikely to be enacted anytime soon. It is also surprising that the French state wants to consult the Caledonian population on the Bougival agreement (renamed the July 12th agreement) and now the Élysée-Oudinot agreement, which defines the creation of a Caledonian state but without its constitution (or fundamental law). Both agreements are essential for the creation of a state and should normally precede any citizen consultation.

It is important to remember that all government proposals must be approved by the Council of State and/or the Constitutional Council . As such, the association expects that some measures will be rejected and therefore invalidated , which is sometimes a deliberate tactic on the part of the central government and is the subject of maneuvers to this end.

There also remains the problem of a majority within the metropolitan parliament, which could also see certain measures or even the entire project rejected, leading some to believe that no solution will emerge before the next presidential elections in 2027.

Maintaining its unique status, the association regrets that the State has opted for assimilation rather than federalization, a step backward from the Matignon-Oudinot and Nouméa Accords, for fear that other territories might demand the same treatment in accordance with the principle of equality. However, as former Overseas Territories Minister Manuel Valls pointed out, the case of New Caledonia, like that of Algeria, is unique. Its specificity could, in our view, have served as an institutional laboratory for studying the implementation of a federal solution within the French sphere of influence. The State’s abandonment of this solution clearly demonstrates to everyone that it will never share power, even in non-sovereign areas, retaining control over related decisions and continuing to exhibit extreme, if not absolute, centralization (reminiscent of its monarchical past). Rather than New Caledonia serving as a test for another type of organization, it is being forcibly brought back against its will into the French fold, to which its own metropolitan population is demanding change.

In this respect, it is not surprising that the main pro-independence political party is announcing a hardening of the power dynamic with the State and explicitly calling for struggle (cf. The Caledonian Union confirms a firm line at its annual congress | Les Nouvelles Calédoniennes ), recalling the tragic moments of the 80s (the Ouvéa cave episode) and thus announcing nothing good for the months to come.

However, for the negotiations to be truly sincere , only the federalism proposed by the association seems to offer a “win-win” solution, with:

– the setting of a new date for a self-determination vote in 2053,

– the establishment of a new federated status to continue those of Matignon-Oudinot and Nouméa,

– the drafting of a Constitution (or fundamental law) to be submitted to the people of New Caledonia on the day of the citizen consultation scheduled for 2026,

– an equal and shared distribution of sovereign powers , including the transfer of international relations, justice and internal security (police),

– legislative sovereignty (internal) permitted by the Constitution concerning non-sovereign powers,

– etc (cf. with France – APROFED ).

Wishing you a pleasant read and reminding you that federalism is the only solution to reconcile unity in diversity.

The APROFED association